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Introduction 
In National Football League Management Council v. National Foot-
ball League Players Association (Deflategate),1 presiding Judge Richard 
Berman issued a strong rebuke of NFL commissioner Roger Goodell’s 
decision to uphold a four-game ban of New England Patriots quarter-
back Tom Brady for his alleged involvement in a ball deflation scheme.2 
Using an assembly of past NFL arbitration appeals decisions, Judge 
Berman ruled that Goodell’s suspension of Brady for four games 
violated the principles of fairness that underlie the Federal Arbitration 
Act and vacated the discipline imposed on Brady.3 Judge Berman sta-
ted that Goodell’s decision was “premised upon several significant legal 
 
1.  Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football League Players 
Ass’n (Deflategate), Nos. 15 Civ. 5916 (RMB)(JCF), 15 Civ. 5982 (RMB) 
(JCF), 2015 WL 5148739 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2015). 
2. Id. at *1. 
3. Id. at *11 (“The Court is fully aware of the deference afforded to arbitral 
decisions, but, nevertheless, concludes that the Award should be vacated.”). 
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deficiencies,” and, even with the deference afforded to arbitrators, 
Berman ruled Goodell’s arbitration decision fundamentally unfair.4 The 
arbitration and subsequent vacation of the decision appears to be the 
catalyst for a discussion that has been in the making since 2011,5 when 
the NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) granted more power 
to the NFL commissioner than ever before.6 
It is easy to dismiss the decision as the conclusion of an over-
reported story that relates to an over-reported league, but Deflategate 
and the facts surrounding the case provide unique insight into the 
tensions that exist between the NFL’s commissioner, owners, the play-
ers’ union, players, and fans. Most notable about Judge Berman’s opin-
ion is its evisceration of Goodell’s behavior as arbitrator,7 a power that 
the most recent CBA expanded in 2011.8 Goodell’s authority does not 
only reach household name players. He has the authority to punish and 
deprive the due process rights of all NFL players,9 many of them making 
little more than the minimum salary10 in a league with a very short 
career span.11 The general application of Judge Berman’s opinion may 
be important in future NFL cases. Additionally, decisions that reduce 
the power of the NFL commissioner or narrow the scope of the CBA 
promote discussions between league officials and union officials, which 
helps to provide notice to players and promotes positive player activity 
outside of the sport. Finally, creating the opportunity for discussion 
 
4. Id. 
5. NFL Clubs Approve Comprehensive Agreement, NFL (July 26, 2012, 8:43 
PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/09000d5d820e6311/printable/nfl-
clubs-approve-comprehensive-agreement [http://perma.cc/HYZ5-EYGK]. 
6. See generally Adriano Pacifici, Scope and Authority of Sports League 
Commissioner Disciplinary Power: Bounty and Beyond, 3 Berkeley J. Ent. 
& Sports L. 93, 93–99 (2014) (arguing that, over time, the major sports 
leagues’ commissioners’ power to sanction players has expanded immensely). 
7.  Deflategate, 2015 WL 5148739, at *20.  
8. Pacfici, supra note 6, at 97.  
9. NFL Players Ass’n, Collective Bargaining Agreement, 204–07 (2011). 
10. Anthony Riccobono, NFL Salaries: After NFL Draft, Rookies Get Rich, Try 
Not to go Broke, Int’l Bus. Times (May 22, 2015, 5:32 PM), http:// 
www.ibtimes.com/nfl-salaries-after-nfl-draft-rookies-get-rich-try-not-go-broke-
1935346 [http://perma.cc/4QKX-S9PN] (noting that the minimum pay for 
rookie players in 2015 was $435,000 and that “[o]nly 20 players on the Super 
Bowl-winning New England Patriots made at least $1 million last season”). 
11. See Average Playing Career Length in the National Football League  
(in Years), Statista, http://www.statista.com/statistics/240102/average-
player-career-length-in-the-national-football-league/ [http://perma.cc/49NS-
E82T] (last visited Jan. 17, 2016) (noting that the average career of an NFL 
player is about three years). 
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between the players union and NFL management allows the public to 
become engaged and provide input that may affect the historically sec-
retive league in positive ways. 
I. Deflategate Decision 
A. Wells Investigation and Disciplinary Letter 
The New England Patriots, a perennial NFL powerhouse since 
2001, played the Indianapolis Colts in the AFC Championship Game 
on January 18, 2015.12 During the game, the Colts requested that NFL 
officials inspect the footballs used by the Patriots because a Colts player 
and Colts staff member reported that an intercepted ball appeared to 
be under-inflated.13 As a result, at halftime, members of the officiating 
crew tested the air pressure of eleven of the Patriots’ game balls and 
found that all of them were underinflated, in violation of NFL rules.14 
Five days later, the NFL announced that Theodore Wells and his law 
firm would lead an investigation with the involvement and cooperation 
of NFL General Counsel, Jeff Pash.15 
The product of the investigation was a 139-page document, most 
often referred to as the “Wells Report,” with an additional one hundred 
pages of scientific evidence designed to disprove the claim that the ball 
deflation was natural.16 The Wells Report was released to the public on 
May 6, 2015.17 The Wells Report concluded that: 1) Jim McNally and 
John Jastremski, both Patriots equipment staff members, deliberately 
released air from footballs, after the NFL official approved the inflation 
 
12. Tom Brady Carries Pats to Rout of Colts, Claims Sixth Super  
Bowl Trip, ESPN (Jan. 19, 2015), http://espn.go.com/nfl/recap?gameId 
=400749520 [http://perma.cc/LEE5-QKWY]. 
13. Theodore V. Wells, Jr. et al., Investigative Report Concerning 
Footballs Used During the AFC Championship Game on January 
18, 2015 1, 7 (2015) [hereinafter The Wells Report].  
14. Id. at 1, 7–8.  
15. Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football League Players Ass’n 
(Deflategate), Nos. 15 Civ. 5916 (RMB)(JCF), 15 Civ. 5982 (RMB)(JCF), 
2015 WL 5148739, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2015) (quoting Theodore V. 
Wells, Jr. et al., Investigative Report Concerning Footballs Used 
During the AFC Championship Game on January 18, 2015 1) (“On 
January 23, 2015, the NFL publicly announced that it had retained Theodore 
V. Wells, Jr. and his law firm to conduct an ‘independent’ investigation, 
together with NFL Executive Vice President and General Counsel Jeff Pash.”). 
16. The Wells Report, supra note 13. 
17. Id.  
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levels; and 2) Brady, “more probabl[y] than not . . . was at least gener-
ally aware of the inappropriate activities.”18 
On May 11, 2015, NFL Executive Vice President Troy Vincent 
mailed a disciplinary letter to the New England Patriots organization.19 
In the letter, Vincent accepted the findings of the Wells Report and 
punished the team for a violation of the NFL’s Policy on Integrity of 
the Game and Enforcement of Competitive Rules (“Competitive Integ-
rity Policy”).20 Vincent fined the club $1 million, stripped the team of 
two future draft picks, and suspended Jastremski and McNally from 
equipment supervision.21 
On the same day, Vincent mailed a similar disciplinary letter to 
Brady.22 Vincent suspended Brady for four games, citing the Wells 
Report’s finding of the quarterback’s general awareness, in addition to 
Brady’s “failure to cooperate fully and candidly with the investigation,” 
and Brady’s inconsistent testimony.23 Vincent noted that Goodell auth-
orized him to inform Brady of the discipline, and Goodell’s authority 
was exercised under Article 46 of the CBA.24 
B. Arbitration 
Brady submitted an Article 46 arbitration appeal of the NFL’s 
disciplinary decision through the National Football League Players 
Association (NFLPA).25 Robert Kraft, who owns the Patriots, did not 
appeal.26 Goodell appointed himself arbitrator of the hearing, as per-
mitted by Article 46 of the CBA.27 Brady and the NFLPA sought recus-
al of Goodell, arguing that he could not fairly arbitrate a matter related 
 
18. Id. at 2. 
19. Deflategate, 2015 WL 5148739, at *4. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. at *5. 
23. NFL Releases Statement on Patriots' Violations, NFL (May 11, 2015,  
8:48 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000492190/article/nfl-
releases-statement-on-patriots-violations [http://perma.cc/W5SL-3QRQ]. 
24. Deflategate, 2015 WL 5148739, at *5. 
25. Id.  
26. Id. (“On May 19, 2015, Patriots owner Robert Kraft is reported to have 
stated that ‘I don’t want to continue the rhetoric that’s gone on for the last 
four months. I’m going to accept, reluctantly, what he [Commissioner 
Goodell] has given to us [the Patriots’ organization], and not continue this 
dialogue and rhetoric, and we won’t appeal.’”). 
27. Complaint for Petitioner, Ex. B, at 5, Deflategate, 2015 WL 5148739, ECF. 
No. 4–2. 
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so intimately to him.28 Goodell denied the request.29 Additionally, Brady 
requested production of all documents used to draft the Wells Report 
and Pash’s testimony regarding his involvement in the creation of the 
Wells Report.30 Goodell denied both requests, deeming them cumula-
tive.31 He explained that only the Wells Report was used to make the 
disciplinary decision and that the NFL presented all the documents 
used to make conclusions in the Wells Report, making any further evid-
ence unnecessary.32 The NFL also claimed that Pash was not important 
enough to the investigation to warrant compelling his testimony.33 
On June 23, 2015, the arbitration hearing was held.34 The same law 
firm that drafted the Wells Report represented the NFL at the hear-
ing.35 Goodell issued the final decision on July 28, 2015.36 
The fourth section of Goodell’s decision addressed Brady’s aware-
ness of tampering with footballs.37 Goodell observed that Brady spent 
a significant amount of time on the phone with Jastremski in the days 
following the AFC Championship Game, which was uncharacteristic of 
Brady and Jastremski’s relationship before that point.38 Goodell threw 
all of Brady’s justifications for the phone conversations out stating, 
“The sharp contrast between the almost complete absence of commun-
ications through the AFC Championship Game and the extraordinary 
volume of communications during the three days following the AFC 
Championship Game undermines any suggestion that the communic-
ations addressed only preparation of footballs for the Superbowl.”39 
Further, Goodell rejected McNally’s arguments related to texts recover-
ed by the Wells Report investigators, including arguments that a text 
discussion between Jastremski and McNally about “stress” actually 
referred to selling Patriots merchandise and texts between Jastremski 
and McNally about Brady’s passer rating being deflated were taken out 
 
28. Deflategate, 2015 WL 5148739, at *5.  
29. Id. at *6. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at *6–7.  
32. Id. at *7.  
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at *8. 
37. Roger Goodell, Final Decision on Article 46 Appeal of Tom Brady 
7–11 (2015) [hereinafter Arbitration Decision].  
38. Id. at 8–9. 
39. Id. at 9. 
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of context.40 In rejecting all the arguments, Goodell stated, “[T]he 
available electronic evidence, coupled with information compiled in the 
investigators’ interviews, leads me to conclude that Mr. Brady knew 
about, approved of, consented to, and provided inducements and re-
wards in support of a scheme . . . [of tampering with] game balls.”41 
Goodell then addressed Brady’s cooperation with the investi-
gation.42 Brady failed to turn over the cellphone he used during the time 
the deflation activities allegedly occurred because he destroyed the 
cellphone before investigators spoke with him.43 Brady argued that he 
always destroyed former cellphones.44 Goodell rejected this argument 
because Brady had produced cell phones for his personal investigation 
that he had owned prior to the cellphone that he had destroyed.45 
Additionally, Goodell noted that the date of destruction, which appear-
ed to be the same day Brady spoke with Wells Report investigators, 
was troublesome.46 Goodell ruled that Brady failed to cooperate with 
the NFL and the appointed investigators, then explained, “[T]he NFL 
is entitled to expect and insist upon the cooperation of owners . . . and 
players in a workplace investigation and to impose sanctions when such 
cooperation is not forthcoming, when evidence is hidden, fabricated, or 
destroyed, . . . or when individuals do not provide truthful inform-
ation.”47 In sum, Goodell stated: 
The evidence fully supports my findings that (1) Mr. Brady 
participated in a scheme to tamper with the game balls after they 
had been approved by the game officials for use in the AFC 
Championship Game and (2) Mr. Brady willfully obstructed the 
investigation by, among other things, affirmatively arranging for 
destruction of his cellphone knowing that it contained potentially 
relevant information that had been requested by the investi-
gators. All of this indisputably constitutes conduct detrimental to 
the integrity of, and public confidence in, the game of professional 
football.48 
 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 10. 
42. Id. at 11. 
43. Id. at 12–13. 
44. Id. at 12. 
45. Id  
46. Id. at 13. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. 
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Goodell then argued that no prior NFL “conduct detrimental” 
proceeding paralleled the Brady issue due to Brady’s unique failure to 
cooperate with the investigation and his outright destruction of 
evidence relevant to the league investigation.49 Goodell cited to the non-
cooperation of players in the Bountygate case50 and explained that those 
players’ behavior could not be used as precedent because Brady’s act-
ions were not coerced by any of the Patriots’ management or coaching 
staff.51 Goodell argued that other players’ failure to be “fully candid” 
with the NFL, while wrong, was never as serious as Brady’s nonco-
operation and destruction of evidence.52 After dismissing all other prev-
ious cases, Goodell concluded that the most appropriate level of disci-
pline to impose on Brady was “the collectively bargained discipline im-
posed for a first violation of the policy governing performance enhancing 
drugs; steroid use reflects an improper effort to secure a competitive 
advantage in, and threatens the integrity of, the game.”53 
Goodell closed the arbitration decision by addressing other legal 
issues advanced by Brady and the NFLPA. Brady argued that he had 
no notice of the NFL’s power to suspend him for “conduct detrimental” 
to the game because it was not included in the “Player Policies” 
document distributed to NFL players every year.54 Goodell ruled the 
argument invalid, explaining that tampering with game balls was 
unquestionably “conduct detrimental” and Brady should have known 
that it would injure the public’s confidence in the integrity of football.55 
Brady also argued that he was not on notice that the NFL could 
discipline him for failure to cooperate with the NFL’s investigation, 
and, further, the examples of “conduct detrimental” to the integrity  
of the game provided in the standard player’s contract failed to  
put him on notice.56 Goodell threw the arguments out, explaining that 
 
49. Id. at 14. 
50. Id. In the Bountygate case, several coaches and players of the New Orleans 
Saints were found to have engaged in a scheme to pay players for causing 
injuries to other players. See Paul Tagliabue Vacates Penalties, ESPN  
(Dec. 12, 2012), http://espn.go.com/nfl/story/_/id/8736662/paul-tagliabue-
vacates-new-orleans-players-bounty-penalties [http://perma.cc/XAW9-JTQS] 
(discussing the results of the players’ appeal, where, although the arbitrator 
affirmed the factual findings that the players engaged in the “cash-for-hits 
program,” the suspensions were dismissed).  
51. Arbitration Decision, supra note 37, at 14. 
52. Id. at 15. 
53. Id. at 16. 
54. Id. at 16–17. 
55. Id. at 17. 
56. Id. 
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the NFL player contract clearly establishes that players may not  
undermine the integrity or perceived good character of players,  
including “any . . . form of conduct reasonably judged by the League 
Commissioner to be detrimental to the League or professional football.” 
Goodell concluded that it is only reasonable to assume that a player 
with an NFL tenure like Brady’s should be put on notice of what is 
“conduct detrimental” to the league.57 
Finally, Goodell determined that he did not improperly delegate his 
authority as Commissioner to determine conduct detrimental as Brady 
had argued during the arbitration. Goodell explained, “I was directly 
involved in the assessment of Mr. Brady’s conduct that led to his sus-
pension and in determination of the suspension itself; I concurred in 
Troy Vincent’s recommendation and authorized him to communicate 
to the club and to Mr. Brady the discipline imposed under my authority 
as Commissioner.”58 
After Goodell entered his arbitration decision, Brady appealed, see-
king vacation of Goodell’s suspension.59 The NFL and Goodell also app-
ealed, seeking confirmation and enforcement of the arbitration award.60 
II. Vacation of Deflategate Decision 
On September 3, 2015, Judge Berman vacated the suspension levied 
against Brady, which lifted the four-game ban before the start of the 
2015–2016 NFL season.61 Berman lambasted Goodell in his opinion, 
noting Goodell’s distinct lack of fairness and neutrality, qualities all 
arbitrators are expected to exhibit.62 Berman first provided the legal 
standard established for reviewing arbitrator decisions.63 Berman then 
explained that the CBA failed to provide adequate notice to Brady of 
the discipline that he could face for equipment violations,64 Goodell’s 
denial of Brady’s request to have Pash testify was wrongful, and denial 
 
57. Id. at 17–18. 
58. Id. at 18. 
59. Nat’l Football League Mgmt. Council v. Nat’l Football League Players 
Ass’n (Deflategate), Nos. 15 Civ. 5916 (RMB)(JCF), 15 Civ. 5982 (RMB) 
(JCF), 2015 WL 5148739, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2015). 
60. Id. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at *9–20. 
63. Id. at *9–10. 
64. Id. at *11 (“The Award is premised upon several significant legal deficiencies, 
including (A) inadequate notice to Brady of both his potential discipline 
(four-game suspension) and his alleged misconduct.”). 
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of equal access to the investigative files was also improper.65 Berman 
minced no words in criticizing Goodell’s brazen disregard for appearing 
(much less being) neutral while arbitrating the Brady appeal. 
A. Legal Standard 
The court explained that arbitration awards are not reviewed with 
the scrutiny normally afforded to judicial hearings, and arbitrators are 
limited by the requisites of “fairness” and “due process.”66 The court 
may only overturn an arbitrator’s decision to the extent that the arbi-
trator violates the Federal Arbitration Act67 which states: 
In any of the following cases the United States court in and for 
the district wherein the award was made may make an order 
vacating the award upon the application of any party to the 
arbitration— 
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue 
means; 
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the 
arbitrators, or either of them; 
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to 
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing 
to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of 
any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been 
prejudiced; or 
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly 
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the 
subject matter submitted was not made.68 
Finally, the court explained that an arbitrator may only make dec-
isions in accordance with the applicable bargaining agreement, and the 
arbitrator “must interpret and apply that agreement in accordance with 
 
65. Id. (“(B) denial of the opportunity for Brady to examine one of two lead 
investigators, namely NFL Executive Vice President and General Counsel 
Jeff Pash; and (C) denial of equal access to investigative files, including 
witness interview notes.”). 
66. Id. at *9 (quoting Kaplan v. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 0258 
(JFK), 1996 WL 640901, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 1996)) (“The deference 
due an arbitrator does not extend so far as to require a district court to 
countenance, much less confirm, an award obtained without the requisites 
of fairness or due process.”). 
67.  9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012). 
68. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a). 
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the ‘industrial common law of the shop.’”69 The “law of the shop” is an 
application of the industry’s common law, or, in other words, the “past 
practices of the industry and the shop,” like prior NFL arbitration 
awards.70 
B. Legal Analysis 
The court found that the “law of the shop” in the NFL is “to 
provide professional football players with advance notice of prohibited 
conduct and potential discipline.”71 Arbitrators in other NFL appeals 
ruled that the only way to fairly discipline players is to make clear what 
the consequences of the players’ actions are.72 Additionally, the court 
found prior NFL arbitration decisions that suggested that obstruction 
of a league investigation does not warrant suspension of a player.73 
Considering the law of the NFL’s shop, the court vacated the 
arbitration award entered against Brady.74 It found that the CBA pro-
vided no notice of Brady’s alleged “misconduct” to the player, and, by 
extension, the CBA failed to provide notice of the severity of punish-
ment that Brady could face as a result of his violation.75 Further, the 
court concluded that denying Brady’s request to interview Pash, one of 
the lead investigators and editors of the Wells Report, was a denial of 
evidence that was “plainly pertinent and material to the controversy,” 
in violation of the Federal Arbitration Act.76 Similarly, denial of access 
to the investigative files was a denial of information that violated 
Brady’s rights.77  
69. Deflategate, 2015 WL 5148739, at *10 (quoting United States v. Int’l Bhd. 
of Teamsters, 954 F.2d 801, 809 (2d Cir. 1992)). 
70. Bureau of Engraving, Inc. v. Graphic Commc’ns Int’l Union, Local 1B, 
164 F.3d 427, 429 (8th Cir. 1999). 
71. Deflategate, 2015 WL 5148739, at *10. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. Notably, the court did not declare this rule to be “the law of the shop,” 
explaining, “[i]n the Bounty–Gate case . . . Tagliabue stated: ‘There is no 
evidence of a record of past suspensions based purely on obstructing a 
League investigation. In my forty years of association with the NFL, I am 
aware of many instances of denials in disciplinary proceedings that proved 
to be false, but I cannot recall any suspension for such fabrication. There 
is no evidence of a record of past suspensions based purely on obstructing 
a League investigation.’” Id. 
74. Id. at *1. 
75. Id. at *11. 
76. Id. at *18 (quoting Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16, 20 
(2d Cir. 1997)). 
77. Id. at *19 (“The Court finds that Commissioner Goodell’s denial of the 
Players Association’s motion to produce the Paul, Weiss investigative 
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1. Failure to Provide Notice 
In overturning the Goodell ruling, the court emphasized the CBA’s 
failure to put Brady on notice of the fact that the steroid policy would 
be the scheme under which he was punished for “general awareness” of 
ball deflation.78 Goodell stated that Brady’s suspension for “general 
awareness” of the deflation of footballs was based on the CBA policy 
related to steroids.79 The court took issue with Goodell’s use of the 
policy and argued that the steroid policy is meant to only address 
players’ steroid use.80 The court explained there was no clear “scientific, 
empirical, or historical evidence of any comparability between Brady’s 
alleged offense and steroid use.”81 The court also noted that Brady was 
only “generally aware” of the deflation activities, and the steroid policy 
failed to put Brady on alert of potential punishment for such a “general 
awareness.”82 The court explained, “no NFL policy or precedent notifies 
players that they may be disciplined (much less suspended) for general 
awareness of misconduct by others.”83 In sum, the court found that “no 
player alleged . . . to have had a general awareness of the inappropriate 
ball deflation activities of others or who allegedly schemed with others 
to let air out of footballs in a championship game and also had not 
cooperated in an ensuing investigation, reasonably could be put on 
notice.”84 
The court also ruled in favor of Brady’s argument that the football 
player was never put on notice of discipline for his failure to cooperate 
 
files, including notes of witness interviews, for Brady’s use at the arbitral 
hearing was fundamentally unfair and in violation of 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) 
and that Brady was prejudiced as a result.”). 
78. Id. at *12 (“The Court finds that no player alleged or found to have had a 
general awareness of the inappropriate ball deflation activities of others or 
who allegedly schemed with others to let air out of footballs in a champion-
ship game and also had not cooperated in an ensuing investigation, 
reasonably could be on notice that their discipline would (or should) be the 
same as applied to a player who violated the NFL Policy on Anabolic 
Steroids and Related Substances.”) (emphasis omitted). 
79.  Id. 
80. Id. 
81. Id.  
82. Id. at *12, *14. (“The Court is unable to perceive ‘notice’ of discipline, or 
any comparability between a violation of the Steroid Policy and a ‘general 
awareness’ of the inappropriate activities of others, or even involvement 
in a scheme by others to deflate game balls on January 18, 2015, and non-
cooperation in a football deflation investigation.”). 
83. Id. at *14. 
84. Id. at *12 (emphasis omitted). 
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with investigators.85 The court provided Wells’s arbitration testimony, 
where he stated, “I did not tell Mr. Brady at any time that he would 
be subject . . . for . . . not turning over the documents.”86 Brady 
appealed to the Bountygate decision, in which former NFL Commiss-
ioner Paul Tagliabue stated, “There is no evidence of a record of past 
suspensions based purely on obstructing a League investigation.”87 The 
court agreed, and stated, “Because there was no notice of a four-game 
suspension in the circumstances presented here, Commissioner Goodell 
may be said to have ‘dispense[d] his own brand of industrial justice.’”88 
The court also drew an important distinction between the Compet-
itive Integrity Policy, which is administered only to team owners and 
management, and the Player Policies, which is given to players.89 
Vincent’s letter to Brady stated that Brady was punished under the 
terms of the Competitive Integrity Policy, but Brady had never seen 
the policy and, therefore, never had notice of the possible infraction.90 
Instead, Brady argued that the only notice he received was found in 
the Player’s Policy, which permits the NFL to fine—not suspend—
players for an equipment violation.91 The court ruled that “Brady was 
on notice that equipment violations under the Player Policies could 
result in fines,” and that “[h]e had no legal notice of discipline under 
the Competitive Integrity Policy.”92 The court cited other NFL “law of 
 
85. Id. at *13 (stating “[i]n further support of his claim that there was no notice 
of his discipline, Brady points to the testimony of Mr. Wells, who acknow-
ledged the following at the arbitration hearing: ‘I want to be clear—I did 
not tell Mr. Brady at any time that he would be subject to punishment for 
not giving—not turning over the documents [emails and texts]. I did not 
say anything like that,’ before affirming Brady’s argument”). 
86. Id.  
87. Id. 
88. Id. (quoting 187 Concourse Assocs. v. Fishman, 399 F.3d 524, 527 (2d 
Cir. 2005)). 
89. Id. at *14–15 (“Brady was on notice that equipment violations under the 
Player Policies could result in fines. He had no legal notice of discipline 
under the Competitive Integrity Policy, which is incorporated into the 
Game Operations Manual and distributed solely to—and, therefore, provides 
notice to—‘Chief Executives, Club Presidents, General Managers, and Head 
Coaches,’ and not to players.”). 
90. Id. at *15. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
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the shop” precedent explaining that the Competitive Integrity Policy 
“could not serve as the basis for disciplinary action against [players].”93 
Finally, the court rejected Goodell’s argument that Brady’s activity 
was punishable under the CBA’s policy that restricts players from 
engaging in activity that is detrimental to the integrity of the NFL.94 
The court found that Goodell was legally expected to rely on the more 
specific Player Policies instead of the more general CBA policy.95 
Additionally, the court pointed to common law and stated, “an applic-
able specific provision within the Player Policies is better calculated to 
provide notice to a player than a general concept such as ‘conduct detri-
mental.’”96 
2. Improper Denial of Opportunity to Examine Pash 
Brady argued that Goodell’s denial of Brady’s request to examine 
Pash was improper and unfair, and the court agreed.97 The NFL’s 
general counsel, Pash, co-led the investigation into the deflated foot-
balls.98 As co-lead investigator, Pash was permitted to review the Wells 
Report before it was made public.99 
The court noted that an arbitrator is not bound by the standard 
rules of discovery and need not listen to every piece of evidence that is 
offered by parties but also noted that “[a] fundamentally fair hearing 
requires that the parties be permitted to present evidence and cross-
examine adverse witnesses.”100 The court also pointed to additional NFL 
 
93. Id. at *14–15 (“NFL arbitral precedent confirms that because Brady did 
not have notice of the Competitive Integrity Policy, that Policy could not 
serve as the basis for disciplinary action against him.”). 
94. Id. at *16 (“Goodell’s reliance on notice of broad CBA ‘conduct detrimental’ 
policy—as opposed to specific Player Policies regarding equipment violations—
to impose discipline upon Brady is legally misplaced.”). 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. at *17–18 (“The Court finds that Commissioner Goodell’s denial of 
Brady’s motion to compel the testimony of Mr. Pash was fundamentally 
unfair and in violation of 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3).”). 
98. Id. at *1. 
99. Id. at *17–18 (“[Brady] was foreclosed from exploring, among other things, 
whether the Pash/Wells Investigation was truly ‘independent,’ and how 
and why the NFL’s General Counsel came to edit a supposedly independent 
investigation report.”). 
100. Id. at *17 (quoting Kaplan v. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc., No. 96 CIV. 
0258 (JFK), 1996 WL 640901, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 1996)). 
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arbitration rulings, where arbitrators ruled that “players must be 
afforded the opportunity to confront their investigators.”101 
Considering both the common law and the NFL’s “law of the shop,” 
the court found that Goodell had acted unfairly toward Brady.102 The 
court found that Pash’s testimony may have been material and that 
Brady was prejudiced because he was “[d]enied the opportunity to 
examine Pash at the arbitral hearing.”103 The denial of Pash’s testimony 
prevented Brady from asking Pash about the execution of the investi-
gation and denied Brady the chance to investigate the edits Pash made 
to the Wells Report.104 Finally, the court explained “[a]s co-lead investi-
gator . . . Pash was in the best position to testify about the NFL’s 
degree of involvement in, and potential shaping of, a heralded ‘indepen-
dent’ Investigation. The issues known to Pash constituted ‘evidence 
plainly pertinent and material to the controversy.’”105 
3. Improper Denial of Access to Investigative Files 
Lastly, the court ruled that Goodell’s denial of Brady’s request for 
documents, memoranda, and other investigation materials used in the 
drafting of the Wells Report was improper because it was fundament-
ally unfair and in violation of the Federal Arbitration Act.106 The court 
denied Goodell’s argument that the interview notes were not pertinent 
to Brady’s punishment, and accepted Brady’s argument that the denial 
was especially unfair due to the NFL counsel’s unique access to the 
files.107 
The court explained that the deference afforded to arbitrators “does 
not negate the affirmative duty of arbitrators to insure that relevant 
documentary evidence in the hands of one party is fully and timely 
made available to the other party.”108 Here, the NFL’s counsel was the 
 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at *18 (“The Court finds that Commissioner Goodell’s denial of Brady’s 
motion to compel the testimony of Mr. Pash was fundamentally unfair and 
in violation of 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3).”). 
103. Id.  
104. Id. 
105. Id. (citing Tempo Shain Corp. v. Bertek, Inc., 120 F.3d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
106. Id. at *19 (“The Court finds that Commissioner Goodell’s denial of the 
Players Association’s motion to produce the Paul, Weiss investigative files, 
including notes of witness interviews, for Brady’s use at the arbitral hearing 
was fundamentally unfair and in violation of 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(3) and that 
Brady was prejudiced as a result.”). 
107. Id. 
108. Id. (quoting Home Indem. Co. v. Affiliated Food Distribs., Inc., No. 96 
Civ. 9707(RO), 1997 WL 773712, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 1997)).  
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same law firm that drafted the Wells Report.109 The NFL’s attorneys 
had all the evidence that Brady requested and they were able to use 
the documents to develop the NFL’s case at the arbitration hearing, 
while Brady’s attorneys were forced to develop a narrative on their own. 
The court ruled that Goodell’s denial was an outright violation of the 
Federal Arbitration Act.110 
Conclusion 
Goodell stepped over the line multiple times while acting as arbi-
trator in the Brady appeal. However, Goodell’s actions as arbitrator 
were not uncharacteristic of the NFL commissioner, and many would 
argue Goodell only acted as the owners expect him to act. Goodell’s 
authority is dangerous to the league and its players. While Brady will 
never have to worry about his financial position, Goodell’s authority 
and the potential abuses that come with it could jeopardize the “every-
day” players working to make a living in the NFL. Taking power away 
from Goodell promotes more collaborative resolutions, and kicking 
Goodell’s decision out now allows the NFL to address this issue in the 
open, much like the Ray Rice and Adrian Peterson cases forced the 
NFL to adopt a new domestic violence policy.111 
Judge Berman’s decision cut Goodell’s arbitration ruling off at the 
knees. Notably, Berman did not spend a single word addressing Brady’s 
culpability, presumably because he found Goodell’s blatant abuses of 
authority to be so egregious. As an outsider, it is easy to mock Goodell’s 
flagrant missteps, but it appears Goodell’s decision was an effort to 
appease the owners who voted him into his position and who he 
represents. In 2011, the NFL adopted a new CBA that granted Goodell 
unparalleled authority and that made him the most powerful commiss-
ioner in professional sports.112 That power exists for a reason. Goodell 
works for the owners and has performed wonderfully in his role as their  
109. Id. at *20. 
110. Id. at *19 (“The interview notes were, at the very least, the basis for the 
Wells Report, and Brady was prejudiced by his lack of access to them. 
Brady was denied the opportunity to examine and challenge materials that 
may have led to his suspension and which likely facilitated Paul, Weiss 
attorneys’ cross-examination of him. Because the investigative files included 
the unedited accounts of the witness interviews, the Wells testimony at the 
arbitral hearing failed to put Brady ‘in the same position as the document[s] 
would [have].’” (quoting Postlewaite v. McGraw–Hill, Inc., No. 98 CIV. 
0611(LLS), 1998 WL 751687, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 1998))). 
111. NFL Owners Endorse New Personal Conduct Policy, NFL (Dec. 19, 2014, 
10:35 AM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap3000000441758/article/nfl- 
owners-endorse-new-personal-conduct-policy [http://perma.cc/VE5B-UQTG]. 
112. Pacifici, supra note 6, at 96–97, 104–05. 
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representative. Goodell works to make the league as valuable and profit-
able as possible, and, working with the owners, he has succeeded in 
doing so.113 Goodell represents the owners in the court of public opinion, 
and he has unfailingly served that task.114 Goodell is asked to serve as 
the whipping boy of the NFL. When players make missteps in their 
personal lives, he is expected to both punish the player while assuring 
the public the NFL is a family-oriented organization. Fundamental to 
walking the line between the league’s disciplinary force and the league’s 
representative is Goodell’s ability to unilaterally administer “justice” to 
players who violate the league’s strict code. So far, Goodell has been 
able to act without dissent from owners, but given additional issues like 
the league’s handling of concussions and off-the-field player issues, 
many have begun to question whether Goodell and the owners will be 
able to maintain the status quo under such significant public pressure.115 
Limitation of Goodell’s authority is positive and helps the league 
as a whole. Goodell’s authority applies to every player in the league, 
from undrafted free agents fresh out of college to future hall of famers. 
Limitation of Goodell’s authority is especially important to those play-
ers whose names only the most diehard of fans will know. NFL career 
spans are incredibly short for the majority of players, and the physical 
toll the sport takes on players limits their career options after football.116 
A practice squad or lesser-known backup player who is punished by the 
NFL does not have the resources or public presence to bring a powerful 
suit against the NFL. Limiting Goodell’s power will make the NFL 
arbitration appeals process fairer and more predictable and will help 
limit the need for lesser-known players to take cases to the legal system 
for a more fair hearing. 
Judge Berman’s decision may promote more discussion between the 
NFL and the NFLPA. When Goodell’s authority is limited, issues may 
be settled with discussions between the NFL and its union, instead of 
with disciplinary letters and arbitration appeals hearings. As a result of 
 
113. Mike Ozanian, The Most Valuable Teams in the NFL, Forbes (Sept. 14, 
2015, 9:51 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2015/09/14/ 
the-most-valuable-teams-in-the-nfl/ [http://perma.cc/A92W-UKNF].  
114. Kevin Clark, Why NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell has Survived,  
Wall St. J. (Oct. 7, 2014, 2:44 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/why-
nfl-commissioner-roger-goodell-has-survived-1412636655 [http://perma.cc/ 
CCF8-YBP5].  
115. Jack Hamilton, Goodell’s Long Fall: Why the NFL Commissioner’s Latest 
Disaster Might Actually be His Undoing, Slate (Sept. 3, 2015, 
7:42 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/sports/sports_nut/2015/09/ 
roger_goodell_deflategate_ruling_why_the_nfl_commissioner_s_tom
_brady_ruling.html [http://perma.cc/FX7E-PJEZ].  
116. Average Career Playing Length, supra note 11. 
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discussions, the NFL and the NFLPA may be more able to make 
headway on talks about other important issues facing the league, such 
as how to better handle player health following player retirement and 
what policies may need to be adopted to better handle off-the-field 
player concerns. 
The Deflategate decision is still new, and the NFL has already filed 
an appeal, so the effect of the case on the league and on Goodell’s 
authority as commissioner will not be observed for a long time.117 What 
is clear is that the effects will be felt by many people in the years to 
come. 
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